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Abstract—We follow the agentization approach and transform
the standard-hidden action model introduced by Holmstro¨m [1]
into an agent-based model. Doing so allows us to relax some of
the incorporated rather ”heroic” assumptions related to the (i)
availability of information about the environment and the (ii)
principal’s and agent’s cognitive capabilities (with a particular
focus on their memory). In contrast to the standard hidden-action
model, the principal and the agent are modeled to learn about the
environment over time with varying capabilities to process the
learned pieces of information. Moreover, we consider different
characteristics of the environment. Our analysis focuses on how
close and how fast the incentive scheme, which endogenously
emerges from the agent-based model, converges to the second-best
solution proposed by the standard hidden-action model. Also, we
investigate whether a stable solution can emerge from the agent-
based model variant. The results show that in stable environments
the emergent result can nearly reach the solution proposed by the
standard hidden-action model. Surprisingly, the results indicate
that turbulence in the environment leads to stability in earlier
time periods.
Keywords–Management control system; Information asymme-
try; Complexity economics; Agentization.
I. INTRODUCTION
The standard hidden-action model introduced by Holm-
stro¨m [1] describes, in general, a delegation relation between
a principal and an agent. It covers a situation in which the
principal delegates a task to an agent. The agent selects an
effort level in order to carry out this task, which is not
observable by the principal (it is hidden). The agent’s effort
together with some environmental impact produces outcome
which is to be shared between the principal and the agent. The
principal’s objective is to maximize her share of the outcome
associated with the task while the agent strives for maximizing
his share of the outcome minus his disutility from making
effort to carry out the task. The standard hidden-action model
proposes an incentive scheme (i.e., a rule to share the outcome)
which aligns the agent’s and the principal’s objective so that
the principal’s utility finds its maximum. As only the outcome
(but not the effort level) is observable for the principal, the
sharing rule is based on outcome only.
This work was supported by the Anniversary Fund of the Oesterreichische
Nationalbank under grant no. 17930.
In order to derive the optimal sharing rule, agency theory
makes rather ”heroic’” assumptions about the capabilities
of both parties with respect to (i) information processing
capacity, (ii) availability of information, and (iii) capability to
find the optimal solution immediately. Axtell [2] argues that
the most ”heroic” assumptions are agent homogeneity, non-
interactiveness, and the existence of equilibrium solutions and
refers to them as ”neoclassical sweetspot”. The result of these
rather ”heroic” assumptions is that the explanatory and the
predictive power regarding real world problems substantially
decreases [3]. Critics often refer to principal-agent models as
”toy problems” and argue that solutions derived from such ”toy
problems”, where authors can ”assume complicating things
away”, are of limited use and only merely help to solve real
world problems [4], [5], [6].
We take up on this critique and put the ”heroic” assump-
tions included in the standard hidden-action model [1] in the
focus of this paper. In the vein of Leitner and Wall [7],
we transfer the standard hidden-action model into an agent-
based model following a procedure introduced by Guerrero
and Axtell [8] and Leitner and Behrens [9], which allows us
to relax some of the included assumptions. In particular, we
relax the assumptions related to the principal’s and the agent’s
(i) information processing capacity and (ii) the availability
of information. We model situations in which the principal
and the agent no longer have full information about the
environment but have to learn this information over time. In
consequence, they can no longer find the optimal (second-best)
solution immediately, like it is the case in the standard hidden-
action model. We, therefore, endow the principal and the agent
with the capability to search for the best possible incentive
scheme over time by employing a hillclimbing algorithm.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II introduces two variants of the hidden-action model. First
the main features of the standard hidden-action model are
presented. We, then introduce the agent-based model variant
which relaxes some of the assumptions included in the standard
hidden-action model. In Section III, we elaborate on the
simulation setup, and introduce and discuss the results. Section
IV concludes the paper and gives an outlook on future work.
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II. THE HIDDEN-ACTION MODEL
This section summarizes the main features of the standard
hidden-action model introduced in [1] and proposes an agent-
based representation of the hidden-action problem in which
the principal and the agent are endowed with limited and
heterogeneous memory.
A. The standard hidden-action model
The standard hidden-action model, which describes a del-
egation relation between a principal and an agent, was first
described by Holmstro¨m [1]. This model covers a situation in
which a principal offers an agent a contract upon a task to
be carried out and a sharing rule over the generated outcome,
among other things. If the agent agrees on the condition stated
in the contract, he exerts effort to complete the specified
task. Together with an exogenous factor, his effort generates
outcome, but this also leads to disutility for him. For the
principal, however, the effort the agent had carried out is
unobservable, which results in a situations where only the
outcome can be used as a basis for the sharing rule. Both the
principal and the agent are individual utility maximizers [10].
Furthermore, it is assumed, that the principal is risk neutral
and characterized by her utility function
UP (x, s) = x− s(x) , (1)
whereby x represents the generated outcome and s = s(x)
is the function for the sharing rule. As mentioned before the
outcome
x = f(a, θ) , (2)
is a function of the agent’s effort a and the exogenous factor θ.
The agent, who is assumed to be risk averse, is characterized
by the utility function
UA(s, a) = V (s)−G(a) , (3)
where V (s) represents the generated utility from the compen-
sation and G(a) denotes to disutulity from the exerted effort.
For the contract to be effective, two additional constraints have
to be fulfilled. First, the participation constraint
E(Ua(s, a)) ≥ U¯ , (4)
which assures that the agent gets at least the utility he would
get from the best outside option U¯ . Second, the incentive
compatibility constraint
a ∈ arg max
a
E{UA(s(x), a′)} , (5)
which aligns the agent’s goal (maximizing his utility) with the
goal of the principal. For an extensive review and the formal
solution to this problem the reader is, for example, referred to
Holmstro¨m [1] and Lambert [10].
B. Agent-based model variant
We transfer the standard hidden-action model [1] into
an agent-based model following the agentization procedure
introduced by Guerrero and Axtell [8] and Leitner and Behrens
[9]. We limit the principal’s and the agent’s availability of
information about the environment and endow them with the
capability to learn about the environment over time. As a
consequence of this change, the principal and the agent can
no longer find the optimal (second-best) contract immediately
Figure 1. Flow diagram
but search for it over time. This stepwise search for the optimal
contract requires us to switch from a one-periodic to a multi-
periodic model in which the principal and the agent agree upon
a contract in every timestep. Due to the employed learning
mechanism (which is introduced below), the principal’s and
the agent’s states of information are changing over time. We
do not give the agent the possibility to allocate effort over
multiple periods. A condensed overview of the sequence of
the events is provided in Fig. 1.
We indicate time steps by t = 1, ..., T . After the adjustment
to a multi-periodic model, the principal’s utility function
introduced in Eq. 1 takes the form of
UP (xt, s(xt)) = xt − s(xt) , (6)
where xt denotes the outcome and s(xt) is the agent’s com-
pensation in time step t. The production function introduced
in Eq. 2 is adapted, so that
xt = at + θt , (7)
where at stands for the effort-level selected by the agent from
a set of all feasible actions At in t. At is a subset of A with
the range from zero to the value at, whereby the latter refers
to the effort-level which is required to achieve the second best
solution according to the standard hidden-action model. Setting
the boundaries in this way is in line with [1] and assures the
feasibility of the solution. We denote the effort level for which
the principal designs the contract by a˜t and refer to it as incited
effort. The variable θt denotes the realized exogenous factor in
t which follows a Normal distribution. Given these adaptations,
the agent’s compensation function s(xt) takes the form of
s(xt) = xt ∗ pt , (8)
where pt ∈ [0, 1] is the premium parameter in t. After the
adaption to a multi-periodic model, the agent’s utility function
takes the form of
UA(s(xt), at) =
V (s(xt))︷ ︸︸ ︷
1− e−η∗s(xt)
η
−
G(at)︷︸︸︷
a2t
2
, (9)
where η represents the agent’s Arrow-Pratt measure of risk-
aversion [11]. The agent strives for maximizing this utility
function but, due to the adaptions outlined below, replaces the
environmental factor θt by his expectation thereof. For the
computation of the agent’s expectation about the environmental
factor see Eqs. 11 and 13.
The most central change during the process of agentization
is the relaxation of the availability of information about the
environment for the principal and the agent. In the standard
hidden-action model [1] it is assumed that both parties have
knowledge about the distribution of the exogenous factor and
its parameterization, so that they can compute an expected
value for the environmental variable. In contrast to this, in the
agent-based model variant they have to learn about the envi-
ronment over time. The assumptions related to the environment
are relaxed in the following way:
1) The principal and the agent no longer have full
information about the environmental factor at the
beginning of the simulation.
2) The principal and the agent are able to individually
learn about the environment over time.
3) The principal and the agent also have the cognitive
ability to store the gathered information about the
environment in their memory.
These changes are implemented by a simultaneous and sequen-
tial learning model (see also [7]). Part of this learning model is
not only the process of gathering and storing the information
but also the application of this information to compute the
estimation of the exogenous factor. Both the principal and the
agent are now able to individually learn about the environment
and estimate the exogenous factor in the same way: They
make their conclusions about the environment on the basis
of the observable outcome xt (see Eq. 7), which is possible
because the only unknown information in the equation is the
realized environmental factor. Recall, both the principal and
the agent know the realized outcome xt, the agent knows the
exerted effort at, and the principal knows the incited effort a˜t.
Using this information, the principal and the agent can infer
the estimations of the environmental factor from the realized
outcome, according to
θ˜t = xt − a˜t , (10)
and
θt = xt − at , (11)
respectively. Furthermore, they are able to privately store
the estimations in their memory until their defined cognitive
capacity (mP for the principal and mA for the agent) is
reached. Once the cognitive capacity is reached, the oldest
entries are replaced by the most recent observations. Their
expectation about the environmental factor is computed by
averaging all privately stored and retrievable estimations of
exogenous factors, so that
θˆPt =

1
t−1
n=t−1∑
n=1
θ˜n if mP =∞,
1
mP
n=t−1∑
∀t≤mP :n=1
∀t>mP :n=t−mP
θ˜n if mP <∞ ,
(12)
for the principal and
θˆAt =

1
t−1
n=t−1∑
n=1
θn if mA =∞,
1
mA
n=t−1∑
∀t≤mA:n=1
∀t>mA:n=t−mA
θn if mA <∞ ,
(13)
for the agent.
Next, the principal randomly discovers two alternative
effort levels in the search space At which together with a˜t
serve as candidates for a˜t+1. Using her expectation about the
environment θˆPt, the principal computes the expected outcome
x˜Pt (according to Eq. 7 ) and her expected utility (according
to Eq. 6) associated with all three candidates. Notice that for
all effort levels the associated premium parameter is computed
according to
pt = max
p=[0,1]
Up(x˜Pt, s(x˜Pt)) . (14)
Finally, the principal selects the candidate with the highest
expected utility as desired effort level a˜t+1 for period t + 1
and communicates the associated premium parameter pt+1 to
the agent. In period t+ 1, the agent starts over the procedure
with selecting an effort level at+1 using pt+1 (see Fig. 1).
III. SIMULATIONS PARAMETERS AND RESULTS
We have conducted 8 scenarios with different underlying
assumptions about the cognitive capacity (memory) of the prin-
cipal and the agent and two different levels of environmental
turbulence.
Recall that the environmental variable is modeled to follow
a Normal distribution. The variations in environmental turbu-
lence are operationalized by altering this distribution’s standard
deviation which is set relative to the optimal outcome x of the
standard hidden-action model (second-best solution in [1]). For
the case of a rather stable environment we set σ = 0.05x
and for a rather unstable environment we set σ = 0.45x. The
distribution’s mean is fixed at zero.
In the 8 investigated scenarios we have, in general, two
configurations related to the cognitive capacity of the principal
and the agent. The first one assumes that the principal has
advantage in cognitive capacity and the second assumes the
opposite situation. Each of them consist of 4 scenarios where
the one in advantage always has unlimited memory and the
other one has either a memory with the length of one or five.
The agent’s Arrow-Pratt measure is always set to η = 0.5,
which characterizes a risk averse agent.
For every scenario we perform 700 repetitions (R = 700),
our analysis focuses on the first 20 time steps (t = 1, ..., 20). In
order to implement our simulation model we use MATLAB R©.
We report the averaged normalized effort level carried out
by the agent in every period t. Therefore in every simulation
run r = 1, ..., R and for every period t = 1, ..., T we track the
effort level atr chosen by the agent, and normalize it by the
optimal level of effort a∗.
p˜t =
1
R
r=R∑
r=1
atr
a∗ (15)
A. Results 1: Advantage in information for the agent
First, we analyze the results in the situation with the
advantage for the agent. In the two scenarios with a relatively
stable environment (σ = 0.05x) we can see that performance
is significantly higher (at the end of the observation period) for
cases in which the principal’s cognitive capacity is higher, too
(in terms of an increase in memory length): As the principal’s
memory increases from mP = 1 to mP = 5, the observed
final averaged normalized effort level increases from 0.9063
to 0.9474 (see the two top subplots in Fig. 2). We can
observe similar results for the scenarios with a rather unstable
environment (σ = 0.45x). Here, the final performance measure
increases from 0.8135 to 0.8785 as the principal’s memory
increases from mP = 1 to mP = 5 (see the two bottom
subplots in Fig. 2). Furthermore, in line with intuition, we can
observe that an increase in environmental turbulence leads to
a decrease in the effort exerted by the agent.
Figure 2. Situations with advantage regarding cognitive capacity for the
agent (A) and the cognitive capacity of the principal (P) with either
mP = 1 or mP = 5. Scenarios a plotted for two different environmental
situations, stable (σ = 0.05x) and unstable σ = 0.45x..
We further analyze the effect of the principal’s memory on
the average variance of the results (i.e., the average variance of
the effort exerted by the agent throughout the entire observa-
tion period): For the scenarios in a rather unstable environment,
the average standard deviation significantly decreases from
0.17405, (for mP = 1) to 0.15719 (for mP = 5). For the cases
of in rather stable environment no significant differences can
be observed. The significance at the 99%-level was confirmed
using an F-test. Thus, increasing the principal’s cognitive
capacity in an unstable environment significantly reduces the
variance of the effort induced by the incentive scheme (and
exerted by the agent). In other words, if the principal manages
to increase her memory in an turbulent environment, she not
only increases the average normalized effort level but also
significantly reduces the risk of extreme deviations from this
value.
Finally, we take a look on the stability of the averaged
normalized effort level. We regard a solution to be stable as
soon as (i) the averaged normalized effort level at period t
is not significantly different from the same measure in period
t− 1, and given that (ii) this condition does not change after
this point in time. For this analysis we perform a T-test and set
α = 0.01. First, we focus on rather stable environments: For
cases with a low (high) cognitive capacity for the principal of
mP = 1 (mP = 5), we observe a stable solution for periods
t = 7 (t = 9) onwards. For unstable environments, we can
observe that a stable solution emerges earlier in both scenarios.
For mP = 1 (mP = 5) the solution becomes stable in period
t = 4 (t = 6). This is a counter-intuitive result as one would
expect that turbulence in the environment leads to instability
in the emergent solution.
B. Result 2: Advantage in information for the principal
This section analyses the cases in which the principal has
an advantage in information. In stable environments (σ =
0.05x), we cannot observe significant differences: For the
agent’s memory of mA = 1 and mA = 5, the observed
final averaged normalized effort levels are 0.9784 and 0.9786,
respectively (see the two top subplots in Fig.3). The same result
can be observed for unstable environments (σ = 0.45x). Here,
the final performances are 0.9507 and 0.9512 for mA = 1 and
mA = 5, respectively (see the two bottom subplots in Fig.
3). Additionally, in line with intuition, we can observe that an
increase in environmental turbulence leads to a decrease in the
effort exerted by the agent.
Figure 3. Scenarios with advantage regarding cognitive capacity for the
principal (P) and the cognitive capacity of the agent (A) with either
mA = 1 or mA = 5. Scenarios a plotted for two different environmental
situations, stable (σ = 0.05x) and unstable σ = 0.45x.
Further, we analyze the effects of the agent’s memory on
the average variance of the results (i.e., the average variance
of the effort exerted by the agent throughout the entire ob-
servation period). For unstable environments (σ = 0.45x)
the observed results are similar to the ones presented in the
previous section: The variances of the exerted effort levels
are significantly different at the 99%-level for mA = 1 and
mA = 5, for the former (latter) we observe a standard deviation
of 0.1953 (0.15781). For stable environmnents, the results indi-
cate that increasing the agent’s memory significantly decreases
the standard deviation of the exerted effort at the 95%-level:
We observe 0.14089 and 0.13821 for mA = 1 and mA = 5,
respectively. Thus, increasing the agent’s cognitive capacity
significantly reduces the variance of the effort induced by the
incentive scheme (and exerted by the him). In other words,
if the agent manages to increase his memory, he significantly
reduces the risk of extreme deviations from the performance
value.
Finally, we investigate the stability of the averaged normal-
ized effort level. First, we focus on the scenarios with rather
stable environments: For the cognitive capacity of the agent of
m = 1 (m = 5) we reach the stable point at period t = 14
(t = 13). For unstable environments we can observe in both
scenarios that a stable solution emerges earlier. For m = 1
(m = 5) the performance reaches a stable point at period t = 9
(t = 7). This leads to the same counter-intuitive result as in
the section before, as one would expect that turbulence in the
environment leads to instability in the emergent solution.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The results presented in this paper deliver some insights
about the effects of heterogeneous agents in a hidden-action
setting:
• Our results suggest, that gathering information about
the environment is a good strategy for the principal to
increase his utility especially situations in which the
environment is rather turbulent.
• In turbulent environments, increasing the memory of
both the principal and the agent always has a positive
effect on the variance of the results. This means that
increasing the memory significantly reduces the risk
of extreme deviations from the performance measures
reported above.
• In stable environments, the results, on the contrary,
suggest that only an increase of the agent’s memory
leads to an significant decrease in the exerted effort’s
variance.
• Surprisingly, the presented results indicate, that turbu-
lence has a positive effect on stability, so that a stable
solution emerges earlier in turbulent environments.
Future work might want to deeper investigate the effects
of heterogeneous memory in the hidden-action setting (e.g,
more memory length) and also include cognitive biases when
characterizing the principal’s and the agent’s cognitive capabil-
ities (such as the recency or the primacy effect [12]). Another
potentially fruitful option avenue for future research might be
to limit the principal’s knowledge about the characteristics of
the agent (such as the utility function).
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